CertC-STR31¶
Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character data and the null terminator
Required inputs: IR
Copying data to a buffer that is not large enough to hold that data results in a buffer overflow. Buffer overflows occur frequently when manipulating strings [ Seacord 2013b]. To prevent such errors, either limit copies through truncation or, preferably, ensure that the destination is of sufficient size to hold the character data to be copied and the null-termination character. (See STR03-C. Do not inadvertently truncate a string.)
When strings live on the heap, this rule is a specific instance of MEM35-C. Allocate sufficient memory for an object. Because strings are represented as arrays of characters, this rule is related to both ARR30-C. Do not form or use out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts and ARR38-C. Guarantee that library functions do not form invalid pointers.
Noncompliant Code Example (Off-by-One Error)
This noncompliant code example demonstrates an off-by-one error [
Dowd
2006]. The loop copies data from
src to
dest. However, because the loop does not account for the
null-termination character, it may be incorrectly written 1 byte past the end
of
dest.
#include <stddef.h>
void copy(size_t n, char src[n], char dest[n]) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; src[i] && (i < n); ++i) {
dest[i] = src[i];
}
dest[i] = '\0';
}
Compliant Solution (Off-by-One Error)
In this compliant solution, the loop termination condition is modified to
account for the null-termination character that is appended to
dest:
#include <stddef.h>
void copy(size_t n, char src[n], char dest[n]) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; src[i] && (i < n - 1); ++i) {
dest[i] = src[i];
}
dest[i] = '\0';
}
Noncompliant Code Example (
gets())
The
gets() function, which was deprecated in the C99 Technical
Corrigendum 3 and removed from C11, is inherently unsafe and should never be used
because it provides no way to control how much data is read into a buffer
from
stdin. This noncompliant code example assumes that
gets() will not read more than
BUFFER_SIZE - 1 characters from
stdin. This is an invalid assumption, and the resulting operation
can result in a buffer overflow.
The
gets() function reads characters from the
stdin into a destination array until end-of-file is
encountered or a newline character is read. Any newline character is discarded,
and a null character is written immediately after the last character read into
the array.
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER_SIZE 1024
void func(void) {
char buf[BUFFER_SIZE];
if (gets(buf) == NULL) {
/* Handle error */
}
}
See also MSC24-C. Do not use deprecated or obsolescent functions.
Compliant Solution (
fgets())
The
fgets() function reads, at most, one less than the specified
number of characters from a stream into an array. This solution is compliant
because the number of characters copied from
stdin to
buf cannot exceed the allocated memory:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
enum { BUFFERSIZE = 32 };
void func(void) {
char buf[BUFFERSIZE];
int ch;
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)) {
/* fgets() succeeded; scan for newline character */
char *p = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (p) {
*p = '\0';
} else {
/* Newline not found; flush stdin to end of line */
while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n' && ch != EOF)
;
if (ch == EOF && !feof(stdin) && !ferror(stdin)) {
/* Character resembles EOF; handle error */
}
}
} else {
/* fgets() failed; handle error */
}
}
The
fgets() function is not a strict replacement for the
gets() function because
fgets() retains the newline character (if read) and may also
return a partial line. It is possible to use
fgets() to safely process input lines too long to store in
the destination array, but this is not recommended for performance reasons.
Consider using one of the following compliant solutions when replacing
gets().
Compliant Solution (
gets_s())
The
gets_s() function reads, at most, one less than the number of
characters specified from the stream pointed to by
stdin into an array.
The C Standard, Annex K [ ISO/IEC 9899:2011], states
No additional characters are read after a new-line character (which is discarded) or after end-of-file. The discarded new-line character does not count towards number of characters read. A null character is written immediately after the last character read into the array.
If end-of-file is encountered and no characters have been read into the destination array, or if a read error occurs during the operation, then the first character in the destination array is set to the null character and the other elements of the array take unspecified values:
#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
#include <stdio.h>
enum { BUFFERSIZE = 32 };
void func(void) {
char buf[BUFFERSIZE];
if (gets_s(buf, sizeof(buf)) == NULL) {
/* Handle error */
}
}
Compliant Solution (
getline(), POSIX)
The
getline() function is similar to the
fgets() function but can dynamically allocate memory for the input
buffer. If passed a null pointer,
getline() dynamically allocates a buffer of sufficient size to
hold the input. If passed a pointer to dynamically allocated storage that is
too small to hold the contents of the string, the
getline() function resizes the buffer, using
realloc(), rather than truncating the input. If successful,
the
getline() function returns the number of characters read,
which can be used to determine if the input has any null characters before the
newline. The
getline() function works only with dynamically allocated buffers.
Allocated memory must be explicitly deallocated by the caller to avoid memory
leaks. (See
MEM31-C.
Free dynamically allocated memory when no longer needed.)
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
void func(void) {
int ch;
size_t buffer_size = 32;
char *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
if (!buffer) {
/* Handle error */
return;
}
if ((ssize_t size = getline(&buffer, &buffer_size, stdin))
== -1) {
/* Handle error */
} else {
char *p = strchr(buffer, '\n');
if (p) {
*p = '\0';
} else {
/* Newline not found; flush stdin to end of line */
while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n' && ch != EOF)
;
if (ch == EOF && !feof(stdin) && !ferror(stdin)) {
/* Character resembles EOF; handle error */
}
}
}
free (buffer);
}
Note that the
getline() function uses an
in-band
error indicator, in violation of
ERR02-C.
Avoid in-band error indicators.
Noncompliant Code Example (
getchar())
Reading one character at a time provides more flexibility in controlling
behavior, though with additional performance overhead. This noncompliant code
example uses the
getchar() function to read one character at a time from
stdin instead of reading the entire line at once. The
stdin stream is read until end-of-file is encountered or a
newline character is read. Any newline character is discarded, and a null
character is written immediately after the last character read into the array.
Similar to the noncompliant code example that invokes
gets(), there are no guarantees that this code will not result in
a buffer overflow.
#include <stdio.h>
enum { BUFFERSIZE = 32 };
void func(void) {
char buf[BUFFERSIZE];
char *p;
int ch;
p = buf;
while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n' && ch != EOF) {
*p++ = (char)ch;
}
*p++ = 0;
if (ch == EOF) {
/* Handle EOF or error */
}
}
After the loop ends, if
ch == EOF, the loop has read through to the end of the stream
without encountering a newline character, or a read error occurred before the
loop encountered a newline character. To conform to
FIO34-C.
Distinguish between characters read from a file and EOF or WEOF, the
error-handling code must verify that an end-of-file or error has occurred by
calling
feof() or
ferror().
Compliant Solution (
getchar())
In this compliant solution, characters are no longer copied to
buf once
index == BUFFERSIZE - 1, leaving room to null-terminate the
string. The loop continues to read characters until the end of the line, the
end of the file, or an error is encountered. When
chars_read > index, the input string has been truncated.
#include <stdio.h>
enum { BUFFERSIZE = 32 };
void func(void) {
char buf[BUFFERSIZE];
int ch;
size_t index = 0;
size_t chars_read = 0;
while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n' && ch != EOF) {
if (index < sizeof(buf) - 1) {
buf[index++] = (char)ch;
}
chars_read++;
}
buf[index] = '\0'; /* Terminate string */
if (ch == EOF) {
/* Handle EOF or error */
}
if (chars_read > index) {
/* Handle truncation */
}
}
Noncompliant Code Example (
fscanf())
In this noncompliant example, the call to
fscanf() can result in a write outside the character array
buf:
#include <stdio.h>
enum { BUF_LENGTH = 1024 };
void get_data(void) {
char buf[BUF_LENGTH];
if (1 != fscanf(stdin, "%s", buf)) {
/* Handle error */
}
/* Rest of function */
}
Compliant Solution (
fscanf())
In this compliant solution, the call to
fscanf() is constrained not to overflow
buf:
#include <stdio.h>
enum { BUF_LENGTH = 1024 };
void get_data(void) {
char buf[BUF_LENGTH];
if (1 != fscanf(stdin, "%1023s", buf)) {
/* Handle error */
}
/* Rest of function */
}
Noncompliant Code Example (
argv)
In a
hosted
environment, arguments read from the command line are stored in process
memory. The function
main(), called at program startup, is typically declared as
follows when the program accepts command-line arguments:
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { /* ... */ }
Command-line arguments are passed to
main() as pointers to strings in the array members
argv[0] through
argv[argc - 1]. If the value of
argc is greater than 0, the string pointed to by
argv[0] is, by convention, the program name. If the value of
argc is greater than 1, the strings referenced by
argv[1] through
argv[argc - 1] are the program arguments.
Vulnerabilities
can occur when inadequate space is allocated to copy a command-line argument or
other program input. In this noncompliant code example, an attacker can
manipulate the contents of
argv[0] to cause a buffer overflow:
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
/* Ensure argv[0] is not null */
const char *const name = (argc && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
char prog_name[128];
strcpy(prog_name, name);
return 0;
}
Compliant Solution (
argv)
The
strlen() function can be used to determine the length of the
strings referenced by
argv[0] through
argv[argc - 1] so that adequate memory can be dynamically
allocated.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
/* Ensure argv[0] is not null */
const char *const name = (argc && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
char *prog_name = (char *)malloc(strlen(name) + 1);
if (prog_name != NULL) {
strcpy(prog_name, name);
} else {
/* Handle error */
}
free(prog_name);
return 0;
}
Remember to add a byte to the destination string size to accommodate the null-termination character.
Compliant Solution (
argv)
The
strcpy_s() function provides additional safeguards, including
accepting the size of the destination buffer as an additional argument. (See
STR07-C.
Use the bounds-checking interfaces for string manipulation.)
#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
/* Ensure argv[0] is not null */
const char *const name = (argc && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
char *prog_name;
size_t prog_size;
prog_size = strlen(name) + 1;
prog_name = (char *)malloc(prog_size);
if (prog_name != NULL) {
if (strcpy_s(prog_name, prog_size, name)) {
/* Handle error */
}
} else {
/* Handle error */
}
/* ... */
free(prog_name);
return 0;
}
The
strcpy_s() function can be used to copy data to or from
dynamically allocated memory or a statically allocated array. If insufficient
space is available,
strcpy_s() returns an error.
Compliant Solution (
argv)
If an argument will not be modified or concatenated, there is no reason to make
a copy of the string. Not copying a string is the best way to prevent a buffer
overflow and is also the most efficient solution. Care must be taken to avoid
assuming that
argv[0] is non-null.
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
/* Ensure argv[0] is not null */
const char * const prog_name = (argc && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
/* ... */
return 0;
}
Noncompliant Code Example (
getenv())
According to the C Standard, 7.22.4.6 [ ISO/IEC 9899:2011]
The
getenvfunction searches an environment list, provided by the host environment, for a string that matches the string pointed to byname. The set of environment names and the method for altering the environment list are implementation defined.
Environment variables can be arbitrarily large, and copying them into fixed-length arrays without first determining the size and allocating adequate storage can result in a buffer overflow.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
void func(void) {
char buff[256];
char *editor = getenv("EDITOR");
if (editor == NULL) {
/* EDITOR environment variable not set */
} else {
strcpy(buff, editor);
}
}
Compliant Solution (
getenv())
Environmental variables are loaded into process memory when the program is
loaded. As a result, the length of these strings can be determined by calling
the
strlen() function, and the resulting length can be used to
allocate adequate dynamic memory:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
void func(void) {
char *buff;
char *editor = getenv("EDITOR");
if (editor == NULL) {
/* EDITOR environment variable not set */
} else {
size_t len = strlen(editor) + 1;
buff = (char *)malloc(len);
if (buff == NULL) {
/* Handle error */
}
memcpy(buff, editor, len);
free(buff);
}
}
Noncompliant Code Example (
sprintf())
In this noncompliant code example,
name refers to an external string; it could have originated from
user input, the file system, or the network. The program constructs a file name
from the string in preparation for opening the file.
#include <stdio.h>
void func(const char *name) {
char filename[128];
sprintf(filename, "%s.txt", name);
}
Because the
sprintf() function makes no guarantees regarding the length of the
generated string, a sufficiently long string in
name could generate a buffer overflow.
Compliant Solution (
sprintf())
The buffer overflow in the preceding noncompliant example can be prevented by
adding a precision to the
%s conversion specification. If the precision is specified, no
more than that many bytes are written. The precision
123 in this compliant solution ensures that
filename can contain the first 123 characters of
name, the
.txt extension, and the null terminator.
#include <stdio.h>
void func(const char *name) {
char filename[128];
sprintf(filename, "%.123s.txt", name);
}
You can also use
* to indicate that the precision should be provided as a
variadic argument:
#include <stdio.h>
void func(const char *name) {
char filename[128];
sprintf(filename, "%.*s.txt", sizeof(filename) - 5, name);
}
Compliant Solution (
snprintf())
A more general solution is to use the
snprintf() function:
#include <stdio.h>
void func(const char *name) {
char filename[128];
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.txt", name);
}
Risk Assessment
Copying string data to a buffer that is too small to hold that data results in a buffer overflow. Attackers can exploit this condition to execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process.
| Rule | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STR31-C | High | Likely | Medium | P18 | L1 |
Related Guidelines
| Taxonomy | Taxonomy item | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
| CERT C Secure Coding Standard | STR03-C. Do not inadvertently truncate a string | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
| CERT C Secure Coding Standard | STR07-C. Use the bounds-checking interfaces for remediation of
existing string manipulation code MSC24-C. Do not use deprecated or obsolescent functions MEM00-C. Allocate and free memory in the same module, at the same level of abstraction FIO34-C. Distinguish between characters read from a file and EOF or WEOF |
Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
| ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | String Termination [CJM] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
| ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Buffer Boundary Violation (Buffer Overflow) [HCB] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
| ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Unchecked Array Copying [XYW] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
| ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013 | Using a tainted value to write to an object using a formatted input or output function [taintformatio] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
| ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013 | Tainted strings are passed to a string copying function [taintstrcpy] | Prior to 2018-01-12: CERT: Unspecified Relationship |
| CWE 2.11 | CWE-119, Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | 2017-05-18: CERT: Rule subset of CWE |
| CWE 2.11 | CWE-120, Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ("Classic Buffer Overflow") | 2017-05-15: CERT: Exact |
| CWE 2.11 | CWE-123, Write-what-where Condition | 2017-06-12: CERT: Partial overlap |
| CWE 2.11 | CWE-125, Out-of-bounds Read | 2017-05-18: CERT: Partial overlap |
| CWE 2.11 | CWE-676, Off-by-one Error | 2017-05-18: CERT: Partial overlap |
Bibliography
| [ Dowd 2006] | Chapter 7, "Program Building Blocks" ("Loop Constructs," pp. 327-336) |
| [ Drepper 2006] | Section 2.1.1, "Respecting Memory Bounds" |
| [ ISO/IEC 9899:2011] | K.3.5.4.1, "The
gets_s Function"
|
| [ Lai 2006] | |
| [ NIST 2006] | SAMATE Reference Dataset Test Case ID 000-000-088 |
| [ Seacord 2013b] | Chapter 2, "Strings" |
| [ xorl 2009] | FreeBSD-SA-09:11: NTPd Remote Stack Based Buffer Overflows |
|
[BC] |
New Linux SUDO flaw lets local users gain root privileges |
Possible Messages
Key |
Text |
Severity |
Disabled |
|---|---|---|---|
buffer_too_small |
{} may write up to {} characters to buffer of size {}. |
None |
False |
forbidden_libfunc_call |
Call to forbidden function. |
None |
False |
maybe_too_small |
Target buffer may be too small. Use snprintf() instead. |
None |
False |
too_small |
Target buffer has {} characters, but sprintf() may write up to {} characters (including null terminator). |
None |
False |
unknown_buffer_size |
Potential buffer overflow: {} used with buffer of unknown size. |
None |
False |
unlimited_read |
Potential buffer overflow: {} has no limit on amount of characters read. |
None |
False |
Options¶
This rule shares the following common options: exclude_in_macros, exclude_messages_in_system_headers, excludes, extend_exclude_to_macro_invocations, includes, justification_checker, languages, post_processing, provider, report_at, severity
The following places define options that affect this rule: Stylechecks, Analysis-GlobalOptions
allow_extra_args¶
allow_extra_args : bool = True
allow_gnu_extensions¶
allow_gnu_extensions : bool = True
allow_unknown_specs¶
allow_unknown_specs : bool = True
blacklist¶
blacklist
Dictionary of header globbing to (list of) function name globbing(s) of forbidden functions.Type: dict[bauhaus.analysis.config.FileGlobPattern, list[bauhaus.analysis.config.GlobPattern]]
Default:
{ 'stdio.h': ['gets'] }
functions¶
functions
A dictionary mapping the names of the functions to check, to a tripleType: dict[bauhaus.analysis.config.QualifiedName, typing.Tuple[str, int, typing.Optional[int]]]
Default:
{ '_printf_l': ('printf', 1, 3), 'fprintf': ('printf', 1, 2), 'fscanf': ('scanf', 1, 2), 'printf': ('printf', 0, 1), 'scanf': ('scanf', 0, 1), 'snprintf': ('printf', 2, 3), 'sprintf': ('printf', 1, 2), 'sscanf': ('scanf', 1, 2), 'vfprintf': ('printf', 1, None), 'vfscanf': ('scanf', 1, None), 'vprintf': ('printf', 0, None), 'vscanf': ('scanf', 0, None), 'vsnprintf': ('printf', 2, None), 'vsprintf': ('printf', 1, None), 'vsscanf': ('scanf', 1, None) }
(function_kind, fmt_param_index, arg_start_index) where
function_kind is either printf or scanf,
fmt_param_index is the index of the format-string parameter, and
arg_start_index is the index of the first variadic argument.
use_static_semantic_analysis¶
use_static_semantic_analysis : bool = True
StaticSemanticAnalysis
to be enabled, but will produce less accurate results if it is not.