CWE-259

Use of Hard-coded Password. [Improper-Access-Control, Improper-Adherence-To-Coding-Standards, Protection-Mechanism-Failure]

Required inputs: IR

The product contains a hard-coded password, which it uses for its own inbound authentication or for outbound communication to external components.

There are two main variations of a hard-coded password:

Inbound: the product contains an authentication mechanism that checks for a hard-coded password.

Outbound: the product connects to another system or component, and it contains a hard-coded password for connecting to that component.

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following code uses a hard-coded password to connect to a database:

Example Language:Java (Unsupported language for documentation only)
    ...
    DriverManager.getConnection(url, "scott", "tiger");
    ...

This is an example of an external hard-coded password on the client-side of a connection. This code will run successfully, but anyone who has access to it will have access to the password. Once the program has shipped, there is no going back from the database user "scott" with a password of "tiger" unless the program is patched. A devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system. Even worse, if attackers have access to the bytecode for application, they can use the javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something like the following for the example above:

(attack code)

    javap -c ConnMngr.class
        22: ldc #36; //String jdbc:mysql://ixne.com/rxsql
        24: ldc #38; //String scott
        26: ldc #17; //String tiger

Example 2

The following code is an example of an internal hard-coded password in the back-end:

Example Language:C
    int VerifyAdmin(char *password) {
        if (strcmp(password, "Mew!")) {
            printf("Incorrect Password!\n");
            return(0);
        }
        printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode...\n");
        return(1);
    }

Example Language:Java (Unsupported language for documentation only)
    int VerifyAdmin(String password) {
        if (!password.equals("Mew!")) {
            return(0);
        }
        //Diagnostic Mode
        return(1);
    }

Every instance of this program can be placed into diagnostic mode with the same password. Even worse is the fact that if this program is distributed as a binary-only distribution, it is very difficult to change that password or disable this "functionality."

Example 3

The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.

This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.

Example Language:Java (Unsupported language for documentation only)
    # Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file
    ...
    webapp.ldap.username=secretUsername
    webapp.ldap.password=secretPassword
    ...

The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext.

Example Language:ASP.NET (Unsupported language for documentation only)
    ...
    <connectionStrings>
        <add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=password; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" />
    </connectionStrings>
    ...

Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information.

Example 4

In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Multiple vendors used hard-coded credentials in their OT products.

Excerpts from CWE [https://cwe.mitre.org], Copyright (C) 2006-2026, the MITRE Corporation. See section 9.4. "3rd-Party Licenses" in the documentation for full details.

Possible Messages

Key	Text	Severity	Disabled
assignment	Assigning a literal to a variable holding a password.	None	False
comparison	Comparing a literal to a password.	None	False
key	The string literal might include a private key.	None	False
parameter	Passing a literal to a password parameter.	None	False
return	Returning a literal as a password.	None	False

Options

• This rule shares the following common options: exclude_in_macros, exclude_messages_in_system_headers, excludes, extend_exclude_to_macro_invocations, includes, justification_checker, languages, post_processing, provider, report_at, severity

• The following places define options that affect this rule: Stylechecks, Analysis-GlobalOptions

critical_routines_pattern

critical_routines_pattern : typing.Pattern[str] = 'authenticate'

Routines with a fully qualified name matching this pattern are considered as taking credentials for parameters

 

key_detection_pattern

key_detection_pattern : typing.Pattern[str] = 'BEGIN (.*) PRIVATE KEY'

Regex pattern used to detect the ASCII armor of private keys in string literals

 

suspect_detection_pattern

suspect_detection_pattern : typing.Pattern[str] = 'password'

Objects with identifiers including the pattern are considered suspects for holding credentials