CWE-269¶
Improper Privilege Management. [Improper-Access-Control, Top25-2024-15]
Required inputs: IR
Demonstrative Examples
Example 1
This code temporarily raises the program's privileges to allow creation of a new user folder.
Example Language:Python (Unsupported language for documentation only)
def makeNewUserDir(username):
if invalidUsername(username):
#avoid CWE-22 and CWE-78
print('Usernames cannot contain invalid characters')
return False
try:
raisePrivileges()
os.mkdir('/home/' + username)
lowerPrivileges()
except OSError:
print('Unable to create new user directory for user:' + username)
return False
return True
While the program only raises its privilege level to create the folder and immediately lowers it again, if the call to os.mkdir() throws an exception, the call to lowerPrivileges() will not occur. As a result, the program is indefinitely operating in a raised privilege state, possibly allowing further exploitation to occur.
Example 2
The following example demonstrates the weakness.
Example Language:C
seteuid(0);
/* do some stuff */
seteuid(getuid());
Example 3
The following example demonstrates the weakness.
Example Language:Java (Unsupported language for documentation only)
AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction() {
public Object run() {
// privileged code goes here, for example:
System.loadLibrary("awt");
return null;
// nothing to return
}
Example 4
This code intends to allow only Administrators to print debug information about a system.
Example Language:Java (Unsupported language for documentation only)
public enum Roles {
ADMIN,USER,GUEST
}
public void printDebugInfo(User requestingUser){
if(isAuthenticated(requestingUser)){
switch(requestingUser.role){
case GUEST:
System.out.println("You are not authorized to perform this command");
break;
default:
System.out.println(currentDebugState());
break;
}
}
else{
System.out.println("You must be logged in to perform this command");
}
}
While the intention was to only allow Administrators to print the debug information, the code as written only excludes those with the role of "GUEST". Someone with the role of "ADMIN" or "USER" will be allowed access, which goes against the original intent. An attacker may be able to use this debug information to craft an attack on the system.
Example 5
This code allows someone with the role of "ADMIN" or "OPERATOR" to reset a user's password. The role of "OPERATOR" is intended to have less privileges than an "ADMIN", but still be able to help users with small issues such as forgotten passwords.
Example Language:Java (Unsupported language for documentation only)
public enum Roles {
ADMIN,OPERATOR,USER,GUEST
}
public void resetPassword(User requestingUser, User user, String password ){
if(isAuthenticated(requestingUser)){
switch(requestingUser.role){
case GUEST:
System.out.println("You are not authorized to perform this command");
break;
case USER:
System.out.println("You are not authorized to perform this command");
break;
default:
setPassword(user,password);
break;
}
}
else{
System.out.println("You must be logged in to perform this command");
}
}
This code does not check the role of the user whose password is being reset. It is possible for an Operator to gain Admin privileges by resetting the password of an Admin account and taking control of that account.
Excerpts from CWE [https://cwe.mitre.org], Copyright (C) 2006-2026, the MITRE Corporation. See section 9.4. "3rd-Party Licenses" in the documentation for full details.Possible Messages
Key |
Text |
Severity |
Disabled |
|---|---|---|---|
check_privilege_drop |
setuid(getuid()) call must be followed by a setuid(0) != -1 check. |
None |
False |
chroot_without_setuid |
The chroot() call should be followed by a setuid() call to drop privileges. |
None |
False |
discarded_return_with_entity |
Return value of function discarded. |
None |
False |
setuid_zero |
Setuid should not be called with 0 as argument, as this grants root privileges. |
None |
False |
unhandled_return_value |
Return value of function call not properly checked. |
None |
False |
Options¶
This rule shares the following common options: exclude_in_macros, exclude_messages_in_system_headers, excludes, extend_exclude_to_macro_invocations, includes, justification_checker, languages, post_processing, provider, report_at, severity
The following places define options that affect this rule: Stylechecks, Analysis-GlobalOptions
allow_assignment_to_globals¶
allow_assignment_to_globals : bool = False
allow_assignment_to_variables_with_pointers¶
allow_assignment_to_variables_with_pointers : bool = True
allowed_functions¶
allowed_functions : set[bauhaus.analysis.config.FunctionName] = {'memcpy', 'memmove', 'memset', 'strcat', 'strcpy', 'strncat', 'strncpy'}
check_operators¶
check_operators : bool = False
functions¶
functions
Allows to declare function names for which a check must exist. The check is expressed as an IR pattern.Type: dict[bauhaus.analysis.config.QualifiedName, bauhaus.ir.common.algorithms.matchers.Matcher]
Default:
{ 'ImpersonateNamedPipeClient': <bauhaus.rules.axivion.expressions.calls.unhandled_return_value.BinaryRelationAnyMatcher object at 0x7f6f1b83a0b0> }
known_check_functions¶
known_check_functions : set[bauhaus.analysis.config.FunctionName] = set()
report_references¶
report_references : bool = False